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Summary: Die Ortung im Eisenbahnverkehr hat eine hohe sicherheitstechnische Relevanz. Eine falsch 
detektierte Position eines Fahrzeugs kann zu einer erheblichen Gefährdung führen, da die ermittelte Orts-
information für die Freigabe und das Wiederbesetzen von Gleisabschnitten genutzt wird. Daraus abgelei-
tet, müssen Ortungssysteme bei der Zulassung unter anderem die folgenden sicherheitskritischen Anfor-
derungen erfüllen Genauigkeit, Zuverlässigkeit, Integrität und Verfügbarkeit der Ortungsinformation, 
die gemäß SIL 4 nachzuweisen sind. 
 
1 Introduction 
In the last years, several research projects developed systems for the navigation of railways by 
using Global Navigation Satellite Systems. Some results were demonstrated all over Europe, 
e.g. DemoOrt [12], SATNAB [1], LOCOPROL [8] or APOLO [3]. 
 
The Institute of Transportation Systems (IFS) of the German Aerospace Center (DLR) in 
Braunschweig is intensively involved in processing basic research in the field of satellite-
based navigation, especially in self-sustaining vehicle navigation for safety-related applica-
tions. 
 
The detection of railway vehicles has a high safety-relevant meaning, since the positioning 
information is used for the track vacancy proving and represents the basis for the release of 
track sections for further trains. Among the safety relevant requirements derived from this 
application rank accuracy, reliability, integrity and availability of the positioning information, 
which are to be proven in accordance to the CENELEC standards with Safety Integrity Level 
4. From the mode of operation further requirements result in each case, e.g. to obtain an accu-
racy of the local information of about 1 to 2 meters for track-exact detection information, or 
real-time near computation of the position for driving in "moving block". While looking at the 
characteristics of satellite-based navigation systems (GNSS - Global Navigation Satellite Sys-
tem), like the US-System GPS (Global Positioning System) or the future European system 
Galileo, however questions with substantial meaning are not yet solved concerning the avail-
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ability of the satellite signals and as a result from it the quality of the gained information. This 
is in particular in tunnels, roofed stations or forest areas the case, since the signals are shaded 
by the environment and thus no signal or only insufficient signal strength arrive at the re-
ceiver. 
 
The same applies to railways, which operate in urban areas, e.g. in urban areas where the sig-
nals are shaded by buildings or the signal running times are extended by multi-path propaga-
tion. The positioning information, which is to be received from these signals, does not corre-
spond then to the actual position of the receiver. The deviation can show extreme drift in 
those areas. The effect of multi-path propagation and/or complete shading within urban areas 
and their impact on the development of detection systems with safety relevance using satellite 
navigation were not considered and/or were not pursued so far by the examined positioning 
systems. The need of further research can be recognized [2]. 
 
From the positioning requirements mentioned above and the characteristics of GNSS follows, 
that the position of a rail vehicle cannot be determined alone by means of satellite-based sys-
tems. Therefore further positioning sensors have to be used. 
2 Today’s Systems - Technical Requirements 
For the introduction of new electronic systems for safety related functions, replacing estab-
lished systems, the safety integrity level of the old system has to be proven (GAMAB princi-
ple – Globalement Au Moin Aussi Bon). This means for a positioning system, that the same 
accuracy and quality of the signal must be reached. Further tasks that are solved by the exist-
ing system, e.g. track vacancy proving or signalling of speed restrictions, the new navigation 
system has to perform in the same quality or an additional system has to be implemented. 
2.1 Track vacancy proving by rail contacts 
Track vacancy proving systems are the main pillars in railway operation. In former times 
mostly axle counters or track circuits are used. A high requirement for safe track vacancy de-
tection is the exact knowledge of the blocked track on lines with parallel tracks. Further the 
position of the train in longitudinal direction has to be known in a sufficient quality for the 
automatic blocking of track sections. 
 
The required position accuracy in cross direction is given by the space between the middle 
axles of two parallel tracks. EBO, §10 (Eisenbahn-Bau- und Betriebsordnung – German law 
for railway construction and operation) defines this space with 4 metres – in special situations 
with 3.80 metres. To obtain track-exact positioning information a accuracy of less than  
1.90 metres is needed. 
 
In longitudinal direction the accuracy of the positioning information is given by the system 
used today. Systems like axle counters do not register the true train front or train end. They 
only can detect the first and the last axle of a vehicle or train. The accuracy of the positioning 
information is therefore according to the design of the vehicle.  
 
The error in the positioning information by using axel counters can reach a maximum equal to 
the space between the vehicle front end and the first axle or last axle and the vehicle rear end. 
 
The following assumptions for a simplified equation for the maximum error are made: 
 
- the outline of the vehicle is a rectangle 















Figure 1: Calculation of the maximum overhang 
 
The maximum error can be calculated as followed: 
 
rC2 – (rC-overinner)2 = (dAxles / 2)2 (1) 




rC  – radius of the curve 
dAxles  – maximum distance between two axles 
overouter  – maximum overhang at the outer side of the curve 
overinner  – maximum overhang at the inner side of the curve 
dmax  – maximum distance between first axle and vehicle front end 
 
The axles of a vehicle have to be designed in a way that curves with a radius of 150 m with a 
gauge of 1.435 metres can be driven without problems (EBO, §21). By using rC = 150 m, 
overouter = 195 mm and overinner = 165 mm (see EBO, Annex 2) the maximum overhang over-
max is given to 3359 mm. The following maximum error in the positioning of the vehicle by 
using axle counters can be calculated to 3.3 m. 
 
Depending on the vehicle type the outline differs. Vehicles with a merely square outline shall 
not exceed the calculated value of 3.3 m for the maximum overhang. If the outline of the ve-
hicle is rounded the maximum overhang can be exceeded without problems. To take in ac-
count that it is not known in complete, which vehicle type is detected by the axle counter or 
track circuit, the proceeded error should be set to 3.3 m. A new positioning system, which will 
replace the existing one, must detect vehicles at least with the same accuracy as the existing 
system. This means, new systems should detect vehicles with an accuracy of 3 metres or less. 
If the system is supposed to detect vehicles track-exact, the error must be lower than 1.5 me-
tres. From this it follows, that new positioning systems for railways should detect the vehicles 
on the track with an accuracy of less than 1.5 metres in cross direction. [13] 
2.2 Track vacancy proving by transponders 
Transponders used for positioning applications contain modules in track- and vehicle-side. 
Examples for transponders are IR-systems or systems reacting on metal masses. All these 
systems use antennas to provide transmission of information. Depending on the used vehicle 
and transponder type the antennas can be mounted on different places at the vehicle. Because 
of this it can be followed, that different distances between vehicle end and antenna is realized. 
This will lead to errors in the detection of the vehicles as it is shown above for the vacancy 
proving by axle counters or track circuits. But by using transponders the error can be much 
greater, because the antennas for the transponders can be mounted in the middle of the vehi-
cle, i.e. the distance between front-end and antenna can raise up to 10 metres – the ETCS-
specifications allows distances up to 12 metres. The radiation beam can cause additional er-
rors. If a positioning system based on transponders will replace the existing systems, an accu-
racy of 5 metres in longitudinal direction will be sufficient. 
2.3 ETCS – European Train Control System 
ETCS requires accuracy for positioning of vehicles using balises of not more than 5 metres 
for the absolute position, added with a deviation of 2% of the travelled way since the last ab-
solute position. The accepted error for the positioning of the vehicle is much higher than sys-
tem operating today can provide. 
2.4 Odometer 
By using odometer, relative positioning information can be generated. The accuracy of the 
information depends on the one side on the used odometer type, and on the other side on the 
reference points and the information transmission type between reference points an vehicle. A 
systematic failure can occur, based on the changing diameter of the vehicle, which needs a 
regular recalibration of the system to minimize the errors. In addition to the systematic fail-
ures random failures must be taken into account. Because of slip and slide of the vehicle 
wheels, the measured distance deviated from the covered distance. The failure mainly de-
pends on the actual weather conditions like rain or foliage on the track. The failures cause by 
drift, and slip and slide can grow with 3% of the covered distance. The absolute error of the 
positioning information depends on the net of reference points used and their accuracy. 
3 Application Requirements 
3.1 Standards and Regulations 
The usage of the positioning information entails the requirements towards availability and 
reliability of the system. For all safety-related application, the positioning information needs 
to meet high requirements regarding to reliability and availability. The positioning systems 
for railways mentioned rank among these highly safety-related applications. 
 
The development of safety-related systems depends on several national and international 
standards and regulations. Some standards and regulations applicable in Germany are listed 
below: 
 
- DIN EN IEC 61508 
- CENELEC standards 
- DIN EN 50126 
- DIN EN 50128 
- DIN EN 50129 
- VDV-publication 161 
- DIN EN 50159 
- EBO 
 
During the development of positioning systems special attention needs to be drawn to the ac-
curacy, reliability and availability of the positioning information. 
3.2 Accuracy 
As mentioned above, different accuracies of positioning information can be reached by using 
different positioning systems.  
 
The required accuracy is depending on the application, which is using the positioning infor-
mation. In case of track vacancy proving, an accuracy of about 3 metres is fully sufficient. 
The needed accuracy for automatic trains in comparison is in a range of a few centimetres.  
3.3 Reliability 
For safety-critical applications the knowledge of the position of a vehicle is of very high im-
portance. But not only the position, also is the confidence interval of the positioning informa-
tion relevant. Hidden errors in the positioning information can lead to fatal accidents.  
 
The possibility to identify errors in the positioning information should be taken into account 
by choosing a navigation system. The best way, is the usage of a combination of different 
systems for performing positioning information as will be explained below.  
3.4 Availability 
The availability is determined by the navigation process, the geography of the railway line 
and the process of transmitting the information. Depending on the application  
- a continuous availability of the information is needed or 
- the positioning information needs to be available at a certain point, time or event. 
 
The positioning information of an axle counter is available at a special point, i.e. when the 
train is passing the counter. The report of an accident in combination with the location is posi-
tioning information which is triggered by a certain event. 
 
If the transmission medium is not available or the passing of last reference point is out of 
range, the whole positioning information is not available. 
 
Especially by using GNSS this problem is given when the vehicle is passing for example tun-
nels or roofed station. These obstacles prevent the reception of satellite signals. As at least 4 
satellites are necessary for the generation of positioning information, the shadowing may 
cause an unavailability of the satellite-based positioning system. Are there enough satellites 
available, but with a high elevation, the accuracy of the horizontal positioning information 
descends, because the distance between the several satellites is to low. In this case, usable 
information is not available. 
3.5 Conditions and characteristics of navigation by using GNSS 
At the moment, two different satellite navigation systems exist. At first there is the GPS pro-
vided by the USA and second the Russian system GLONASS which only has an insufficient 
availability. In 2009 the European system Galileo will go in service. The Galileo system will 
then be the only civilian GNSS available. 
 
There are some experiences from the usage of GNSS for dynamic traffic applications: 
- For several years, systems based on GPS are operated in commercial aviation. But it 
has to be mentioned, that in the aviation the pilot can get back the control of the air-
craft in most of the situations. [9] 
- In road traffic, several non-safety critical applications are using common off-the-shelf 
GNSS based systems. The price of these systems decreases since the demand is in-
creased. These applications show that GNSS in combination with other positioning so-
lutions, such as dead-reckoning, is usable for different dynamic application. 
- In case of GNSS based systems for railways, an external operation is responsible for 
providing the information used for safety critical applications. Looking at GPS or 
GLONASS, the ministries of defences of the two countries are the operator. Conse-
quently in railways both systems can be used for non-safety critical applications only. 
 
Unlike in aviation, where no obstacles influence the reception of the satellite signals in the 
aircraft, several impacts on the GNSS signal can be detected. Out of a long list only a few 
may be mentioned here: 
- partly shading by bridges, forests, slopes, buildings, etc.; 
- total shading by tunnels, roofed stations, etc.; 
- electromagnetically influences by overhead cables or high voltage lines; 
- mirroring by buildings, slopes, bridges, etc.; 
- sabotage by jamming transmitters. 
 
All these disturbances can lead to a reduction of the signal quality and further more to inaccu-
rate or total failing positioning by GNSS.  
 
A train is travelling most of the time between slopes, buildings or in forests where only a 
small part of the sky can be seen and the signals of only a few satellites are available. A re-
duces signal and positioning quality is the result of such a situation. Some of these impacts 
can be mitigated by means of technical procedures, e.g. by special orientation of the antennas. 
Other ones, like full shading of the signal can not be removed technically. [2] 
3.6 Digital map 
Some navigational functions, e.g. determination of travelled way or actual speed can be ful-
filled without using a digital map. Other like the topological positioning can not be performed 
without such a digital map. The digital map is a central element for safety related positioning 
that must not failed. The map is a single point of failure, because typical failures are made 
during the production of the map. Even verification or proving of plausibility can only per-
form low security against failures in the map.  
4 Possible solutions 
In the last years some approaches are made for solving the problems by using GNSS based 
positioning performing safety relevant applications [3, 10]. All these approaches need to deal 
with the actual standards and regulations applicable for railway. systems for safety-related 
applications must be designed as a system with two parallel channels in diversity. There are 
two reasons for this: 
- technical safety and availability can be reached and 
- systematically problems with measurement processes are reconcilable. 
 
From these requirements coming from standards and rulebooks follows, that a GNSS based 
navigation for safety critical applications can only be performed in combination with other 
positioning solutions. Some approaches for the development of such a system with diversity 
have been investigated: 
- odometer; 
- transponder / balises (e.g. international projects like Gaderos [4] or Locoprol [8]); 
- GSM; 
- eddy current sensor [5]; 
- radar [6]; 
- inertial systems [7]. 
 
Even if these merely are research projects it can be demonstrated that the required safety and 
availability for safe railway application can be reached with the apporach of diversity.  
 
In a simplified version, these approaches are known in the USA for systems as “Direct Train 
Control” or “Dark Territory Control”. In these situations a more or less simple system called 
“Positive Train Control” can operate [11]. Such a system is comparable to the German system 
“Satellitengestützter Zugleitbetrieb - SatZB”. 
 
4.1 Performance of different combinations of positioning systems 
As mentioned above, a GNSS like the European system Galileo needs to be combined with 
other positioning systems to reach the safety level required.  
 
The Institute of Transportation Systems will built up a GNSS based positioning platform, 
which can be combined with different other navigation system, to develop a platform that can 
be used for safety related applications.  
 
Only a few of the systems that can be combined with the GNSS based platform will be dis-
cussed in this chapter. 
4.1.1 Eddy-Current-Sensor 
Eddy-Current-Sensors can perform a reliable and slip free distance measurement [5]. Based 
on the use of magnetic fields, inhomogeneities like rail clamps or switches can be detected.  
The inhomogeneities will be shown in frequency signatures, which then must be compared 
with stored signatures of the line to get position information. 
 
The eddy current sensor provides a continuous path measurement, comparable with other 
odometer technologies, but with a higher accuracy and without influences due to slip and 
slide. At irregular discrete points an absolute position can be provided by using switch detec-
tion. For this purpose databases with track signatures and a digital map are needed. 
 
The advantage of the eddy current technology lies in the wheel independent measurement of 
path, velocity and special events like switches. In addition to this, the eddy current sensor is 
extremely robust against climatic influences. The quality of the navigation information does 
not decrease by snow, ice or other hard weather conditions. 
 
The huge drawback of this system is the need of databases for the comparison of the meas-
ured electromagnetically signatures for receiving position information. 
 
The combination of GNSS with an eddy current sensor was developed in the research project 
“DemoOrt”, funded by the German Ministry of Research and Education, and will be tested in 
2007 on different tracks [12]. 
4.1.2 Inertial system 
An inertial navigation system performs the measurement of orientation and position changes 
out of the acceleration of moved objects.  
 
High-sensitive accelerometers in three axles register accelerations in these three directions in 
space. Over the time integrated they determine speed, and a further integration leads to the 
distance in these directions in space. Since the inertial navigation platform itself can turn, an-
gular accelerations must be measured too. 
 
In operation many errors influence the quality of the position information. The most important 
ones are gyroscope drift, scale error and balance error. They cause a square increase of the 
positioning error over the time. A drift of a few percentages is possible. 
 
Inertial navigation systems combine proven and robust technology with insensitivity against 
weather conditions. But on the other side, inertial systems tend to high drift in the measure-
ment of acceleration and need recalibration in short terms. 
4.1.3 Radar 
Microwave radars are contactless sensors for the measurement of the way and the speed 
above ground. For measurement two microwave lobes are radiated diagonally with a fre-
quency by approximately 24 GHz on the ground. The waves reflecting from the underground 
are received, whereby the Doppler Effect is used.  
 
Doppler Effect means that frequency shift between sent and received wave exists, which de-
pends on the speed of the train and the angle, with which the electromagnetic field is sent 
relative to the ground.  
 
The evaluation procedure determines the frequency in the intersection of the two Doppler 
spectra. In addition apart from the determination of the Doppler frequency the Doppler phase 
of an antenna is measured. From these measured values the sensor speed, the path and the 
sensor direction of motion can be calculated. [12] 
 
On the one hand radar sensors take the advantage of no influences by slip and slide because of 
the contact less measurement. The measured signals can only be transformed in relative posi-
tion information. Absolute position information cannot be performed by a radar sensor.  
On the other hand a radar sensor is sensible towards rain and ice, which can deflect the sig-
nals. 
 
Radar sensors are still in operation in railways, for example in locomotives of the 101-series 
of the German railway DB.  
5 Conclusions 
There are some experiences in the field of navigation of rail vehicle with different measure-
ment processes which are collected during several research projects in the last years. All these 
projects show, that positioning on vehicle side can be made in principle. 
 
To perform a positioning for safety related applications with the required availability, reliabil-
ity and accuracy the combination of different positioning methods is needed. The combination 
of GNSS together with other train borne systems, e.g. eddy current sensors, inertial navigation 
system or radar, can bring a technological diversity, which is required for safety-related posi-
tioning.  
 
Every train borne positioning approach needs a safe and highly detailed digital map. This map 
is a single point of failure in the whole positioning system. Therefore a well described stan-
dard for carrying out a safety case for digital maps needs to be developed in the nearer future. 
 
But also every positioning system has its own failures, like drift, sensitivity against climatic 
influences and other that have to be taken into account while developing a navigation plat-
form. 
 
A navigation platform for train borne positioning based on GNSS will be built up at the IFS to 
analyse the interaction between different positioning systems. 
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